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A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
DOMESTIC AGRICULTURAL POLICIES FOR THE STABILITY
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE*
by
Anthony C. Zwart and David Blandford**
ABSTRACT
On the basis of recent research into international price sta­
bility, a generalized model is used to analyze the implications of 
agricultural and trade policies in an individual country for domestic 
and world market stability. Emphasis is placed on the way in which 
specific instruments or combinations of instruments influence the 
excess function of the country concerned. These instruments are 
presumed to respond to changing domestic supply conditions and world 
prices, and can be loosely grouped under pricing policies, storage 
policies and trade control policies.
In each case, it is shown that specific policies can have mark­
edly different implications for the stability of world prices and 
trade. To highlight these differences, seven alternative policies 
which might be used to attain domestic stability are examined in 
detail. It Is demonstrated that under many of these policies world 
market prices can be more stable than under free trade. The foreign 
exchange implications of individual policies are also discussed, and 
an optimal trade control policy which does not involve supply re­
straints is identified.
The analytical results derived in this study suggest the need for 
a more careful analysis of existing policies, and a more flexible 
approach to the development of structural models to describe their 
effects. Appropriate structural models for seven of the most commonly 
occurring policy environments are identified.
*Based upon research supported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Economic Research Service, International Economics Division, under 
Cooperative Agreement No, 58-3J22-4-00293 entitled, "Implications of 
foreign countries' agricultural and trade policies for U.S. grain 
market stability and the design of U.S. commodity programs."
**Tony Zwart is professor of agricultural marketing at Lincoln Col­
lege, Canterbury, New Zealand, and visiting professor at Cornell 
University, Ithaca, New York 14853. David Blandford is an associate 
professor of agricultural economics at Cornell University.
2INTRODUCTION
International agricultural trade has been a major focus for agri~ 
cultural economic research in recent years■ The complexity of the 
issues involved has led to a diversity of approaches and analytical 
models to aid in this research. In the tradition of classical and 
neo-classical theory, international trade has tended to be analyzed in 
a static framework in which public policy plays a neutral or residual 
role• However, the recognition of the importance of domestic agricul— 
tural and macroeconomic policies, and their implications for agricul- 
tural trade, has led to the development of more realistic analytical 
frameworks.
Instability, both of prices and production, has traditionally 
been a feature of trade in agricultural products and has prompted the 
development of many of the alternative models. However, there have 
been difficulties in the integration of stability-related research 
with that which attempts to measure the static effects of trade inter­
vention . Distortions in expected prices and trade flows created by 
policy intervention have normally been used as measures of the level 
of protection in a particular country, and in the calculation of the 
welfare gains from freer trade. In more recent studies, attention has 
focused on the distortions resulting from the instability generated by 
domestic policies. Research in this area suggests that single meas­
ures of protection, such as effective protection or producer and 
consumer subsidy equivalents, are insufficient to identify fully the 
distortions which domestic policies might create, or to evaluate the 
implications of freer trade« Measures such as subsidy equivalents are 
primarily designed to capture the effective price distortion caused by 
the existing policies, and although quantity effects can be evaluated 
through domestic response elasticities, these do not always accurately 
reflect the impact of the policies or the Implications of their with­
drawal. Common problems include the representation of storage poll- 
cies which may incur relatively modest budgetary outlays and yet have 
major impacts on trade and its stability, or the treatment of produc- 
tion or delivery quotas which may also include minimal financial out­
lays but have a dramatic impact on production or trade.
The importance of these factors derives from the extensive use of 
such policy instruments, and others whose primary focus is the sta­
bilization of prices or quantities. Difficulties in the measurement 
of protection, or trade distortions, are clearly generated by attempt— 
ing to reduce the impacts of a complex set of policy instruments to a 
single financial measure. While a single measure may permit the 
determination of the approximate effect of a set of domestic policies 
upon the position of the excess supply or demand function, it is un­
likely to capture the impact of these policies upon the shape of the 
function. In order to reflect this important aspect, it is necessary 
to focus explicitly upon the impact of specific policies upon the 
excess functions. Once this impact is determined, indicators of the 
efficiency or distributional implications of the policies, e.g., their 
financial implications or effects upon the stability of prices,’can be 
derived. *
3The framework which is developed in this study demonstrates how 
individual policies, and combinations of policies used by particular 
countries interact to affect the excess supply and demand relation- 
ships for a product. Such a framework provides an important input in 
the development of positive models for analyzing the implications of 
changing policies in specific countries and their repercussions on 
international trade. While there is no attempt to develop a normative 
model to determine optimal national or international policies, the 
framework developed can be used to measure the welfare implications of 
changes, and can aid in the determination of improved policies.
The framework is based upon a simple, generalized model of an 
individual country. This model is used to demonstrate how a wide 
range of specific policy instruments affect the country’s excess 
supply and/or demand curve for a particular product. The implications 
of these policies for international equilibrium are determined, and 
comparisions are made between alternative instruments or combinations 
of instruments which can be used to pursue objectives such as self- 
sufficiency or the maximization of export revenues. These examples 
are developed to demonstrate the implications of the wide range of 
mechanisms which might be encountered in modeling domestic agricul­
tural policy in a particular country. The report concludes with a 
discussion of an empirical framework for the development of individual 
country models which might be used for further analysis of the issues 
discussed.
41.0 A BRIEF REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH
In this section, a brief review of the existing research into 
international price stability is presented. While there has been a 
considerable amount of research into the general problems associated 
with international trade instability, it is argued that this research 
has been fragmented into specific areas which have often been treated 
in a relatively independent manner. This is not surprising given the 
scope and nature of the problem, but it is only in recent years that 
attempts have been made to develop a more comp rehensive framework 
which might be used to analyze both the sources and solutions to the 
problems of instability. The following discussion outlines the devel­
opment of this research and describes its major areas.
1.1 The Welfare Implications of Stabilization
One of the earliest, and perhaps the most exhaustively treated, 
areas of research has been the analysis of the welfare implications of 
stabilizing prices. Following initial work by Waugh (1944), Oi 
(1961), and Hassell (1969), which analyzed the welfare implications of 
using buffer stock policies to stabilize market prices, a substantial 
body of literature has developed using partial equilibrium models to 
measure the size and distribution of welfare gains both within and 
between countries. The models developed have become increasingly 
sophisticated as they have attempted to incorporate more realistic 
assumptions on market conditions, including nonlinearity of the supply 
and demand relationships, the nature of disturbances, the manner in 
which producer expectations are formed, and attitudes to risk. This 
extensive literature is probably best summarized by Sarris and Taylor 
(1978), Turnovsky (1978), and Newbery and Stiglitz (1981). Unfortun­
ately, the results are difficult to generalize. Although the studies 
concur that there is a net social benefit from market price stabiliza­
tion, distributional implications are dependent on specific market 
conditions. Logically, this has led to the development of empirical 
models in which the authors attempted to determine the welfare impli­
cations of buffer stock policies in particular markets. These studies 
cover a wide range of industries and are, in some cases, related to 
specific proposals to develop buffer stocks for particular indus­
tries. Examples of such studies are presented in Adams and Behrman 
(1978), Adams and Klein (1978) and Labys (1975). Although most of 
these models relied on specified storage rules which either completely 
or partially stabilized prices, several models were also developed to 
estimate optimal storage rules (e.g., Kim, Goreux and Kendrick, 1975; 
Dalton, 1978; and Lee and Blandford, 1980 and 1981). The major con­
tribution of these empirical studies appears to be in Identifying 
problems associated with specifying the nature of the storage rules 
and in suggesting the size of buffer stocks which might be required to 
contribute to stability in world markets.
Research into the welfare effects of price stabilization has pro­
vided many insights into the implications of stabilization, but has 
done little to describe why stabilization is necessary, or whether
5alternatives to storage policies exist for stabilizing markets. In 
many of the models developed it has been assumed that markets are 
competitive and that instability arises from fluctuating supply or 
demands In more recent studies, however, it has been recognized that 
commodity markets are influenced by domestic agricultural and trade 
policies, or the lack of perfect competition. This has led to several 
studies of the welfare implications of stabilization under such condi­
tions (Young and Schmitz, 1984; Newbery, 1984; and Sarris and Taylor, 
1978)» The results of these studies introduce further complications 
and uncertainties in attempting to evaluate the welfare implications 
of using storage programs to stabilize markets*
It is possible that a major shortcoming in this area of research 
has been the focus on stockholding and price stabilization, without 
considering more basic questions about the causes of instability and 
why private storage may not be optimal. Recent articles by Sarris 
(1982) and Chisholm (1982) are examples of a more fundamental approach 
which attempts to understand the role of storage and causes of market 
failure in international commodity markets. This is an alternative 
approach to that of earlier studies in which it was concluded that 
benefits from stockholding which stabilized markets would be suffi­
cient to justify government or international intervention.
Throughout this body of literature, there appears to be develop- 
ing a reevaluation of the role of public stockholding and an accept­
ance of the idea that the justification for public intervention 
relates to more diverse objectives than simply the maximization of 
economic surplus. The casual observation that most publicly owned 
buffer stocks do not function independently but as part of a more 
comprehensive set of commodity policies, lends support to this view.
1.2 The Role of Domestic Agricultural Policies
As a result of the instability in grain prices in the early 
1970s, there developed a growing awareness of the role of national 
policies in creating international market stability. The nature of 
the problem was first outlined by Johnson (1975) who stated that, "If 
governments are Interested in price stability for agricultural com­
modities, their primary interest is in stability of prices within 
their own country" and as a result that, "The control of imports and/ 
or exports to stabilize internal prices increases the variability of 
prices elsewhere in the world,"
There followed a number of studies in which the authors identi­
fied in a more formal manner the relationship between national poli­
cies and international price stability. Bale and Lutz (1979) 
developed a simple theoretical model which showed how trade and pric­
ing policies for stabilizing domestic prices could lead to instability 
in prices in international markets, A model developed by Shei and 
Thompson (1977) was used to demonstrate how changes in specific trade 
policies might destabilize the world wheat market. In other studies, 
such as those of Zwart and Meilke (1979), Grennes, Johnson and Thursby
6(1978), and Bigman and Reutllnger (1979), the trade-off between buffer 
stock policies and national policies was identified* It was argued 
that a substantial proportion of price instability in grain markets is 
attributable to protective pricing policies, and that the modification 
of domestic policies would provide a viable alternative to buffer 
stocks for the stabilization of world markets• However, an alterna— 
tive argument has been made that the creation of buffer s tocks would 
provide the global stability to allow protective policies to be dis­
mantled (Newbery and Stiglltz, 1981, p. 275). While this issue may 
prove difficult to resolve, the understanding of the relationship 
between national policies and international stability has grown 
rapidly, and other areas of research have focused on this issue. 
Although not mutually exclusive, there are four related areas In which 
such research has developed in recent years.
The first is represented by studies which have attempted to meas­
ure the international implications of changes in the policies of 
specific countries. These studies are characterized by the acceptance 
of the given set of policy instruments in a country, and the desire to 
understand the effect of these upon the stability and level of inter­
national prices. Such studies are a logical extension of the conven­
tional analysis of domestic policy changes, but reflect the changing 
awareness of the international policy interdependence. Many of these 
studies have been empirically based (see for example Offutt and 
Blaridford, 1984; Sharpies and Goodloe, 1984; Schwartz and Ralston, 
1983), while others have relied on more general theoretical models 
(Sampson and Snaps, 1980; Schmitz and Koester, 1984) to describe the 
relationship between individual countries and world markets. More 
general studies such as that by Bigman (1980) have used simple simula­
tion models to demonstrate the differing impacts of commonly used 
pollcy instruments• These studies have confirmed the general hypothe­
sis that while market instability may be Initiated by fluctuations in 
production, attempts by individual countries to insulate themselves 
from the effects of these fluctuations may further accentuate world 
instability.
A second area of research has had a more global orientation and 
has attempted to understand the nature of the policies In individual 
countries and their contribution to market instability. Increased 
attention has been paid to the comparison and documentation of poli­
cies (Jafeara, 1981, and I.W.C., 1983), and to more general discussions 
which compare national policies and discuss how they interact in world 
markets (OECD, 1980). In other studies, such as those by Josling 
(1980) and Blandford (1983), more formal analyses have been performed 
to evaluate the behavior of individual countries and their contribu­
tion to instability. Attention has focused on the responsiveness of 
domestic stocks and prices to changes in world prices, as a measure of 
the stabilizing influence of individual countries’ policies. Informa­
tion and analyses of this type may prove to be important in interna­
tional trade negotiations as an adjunct to existing information on 
absolute levels of protection.
7A third, and markedly different, area of research has developed 
from theoretical models which are used to derive optimal national 
policies for individual countries. The most sophisticated of these 
models developed by Sarris and Freebairn (1983 and 1984) allows the 
authors to evaluate the Interaction of changing national objectives on 
international trade in wheat and rice. Because they do not necessari­
ly rely on the existing set of policy instruments, and derive optimal 
policy instruments and levels, the use of such models would appear to 
have considerable advantages for the analysis of changing policy 
objectives in individual countries. The major disadvantage, however, 
stems from the need to estimate national objective functions and their 
associated weights. In recent studies, these weights have been esti­
mated from observed behavior, but this raises questions about how one 
country's objectives may change in response to changes in those of 
other countries. The models also tend to be restricted by the limited 
range of policy instruments which can be incorporated, although a 
recent model developed by Paarlberg and Abbott (1984) extends this 
range beyond the simple pricing instruments used in previous studies. 
With further research in this area, normative models will undoubtedly 
become increasingly useful in understanding the development of 
national agricultural policies.
A fourth area of research has concentrated on the development of 
models which can be used to evaluate noncompetitive behavior in world 
trade, especially in grains. Earlier models had relied on competitive 
assumptions, and equilibrium levels of world prices and trade flows 
were derived by equating domestic supply and demand relationships 
across countries, either in econometric models (Rojko, et al., 1971) 
or in spatial price equilibrium models (Schmitz and Bawden, 1973),
The growing awareness of the potential impact of domestic pricing 
policies discussed previously led to the development of approaches 
which attempted to incorporate these policies directly. Some of the 
earlier models, such as those developed by Abbott (1979) and Zwart and 
Meilke (1979), relied on estimates of the excess supply and demand 
functions for the individual countries involved in world trade. In 
these cases, differences between observed excess functions and previ­
ous estimates of domestic supply and demand relations were presumed to 
reflect the distortions which were created by government policies. 
Other studies, such as Lattimore and Zwart (1978) and Tyers and 
Chisholm (1982) incorporated more sophisticated models of the rela­
tionships between the domestic markets and the excess supplies and 
demands which formed world prices. This work was closely related to 
more general studies which identify relationships between domestic and 
international prices (Bredahl, et al., 1979), and the general problems 
associated with developing positive models of government behavior 
(Rausser, et al., 1982).
In these studies, domestic policies have generally been defined 
in terms of domestic price linkage equations and generalized models of 
Inventory behavior. Other than simulation studies, such as Bigman 
(1980) or graphical analyses (Josling, 1981), there has been a lack of 
analysis of the linkages between individual policy instruments, or 
combinations of instruments, and world market stability.
8An alternative framework for analyzing noncompetitive behavior in 
world grain markets has developed around the concept of individual 
countries or market intermediaries exercising market power in the 
pricing and trading in agricultural products. In studies by McCalla 
(1966), Alaouze, et al. (1978), Carter and Schmitz (1979), and Karp 
and McCalla (1983), descriptive models have been developed to aid the 
discussion of how countries might exercise market power, and its 
implications for international markets. Unfortunately, the hypothe­
sized existence of such market behavior has been subjected to little 
empirical testing. Furthermore, there would appear to be a potential 
conflict between these theories and those previously discussed which 
that international market behavior is primarily determined by 
attempts to satisfy domestic goals such as internal price stability. 
Even where there are organizations such as export marketing agencies, 
xt should be noted that these are largely a product of government 
agricultural policies and must remain responsive to domestic objec­
tives. It is possible that the discrepancies between these two 
approaches might be resolved by a more careful analysis of the policy 
instruments which are utilized in individual countries, and the fac­
tors which influence the setting of these instruments.
1.3 Summary and Implications
In this brief literature review, the major themes of research in­
to stability problems in agricultural trade have been described. In 
the discussion, the growing awareness of national policies as a con­
tributor to instability has been highlighted. This development has 
led to a movement away from studies in which the welfare impacts of 
stabilization activities such as buffer stocks are analyzed, to more 
complex models in which the relationships between domestic policies 
and objectives and international trade are defined. One of the major 
limitations to existing work in this area has been the tendency to 
generalize the impacts of alternative policy instruments, or to only 
consider a limited range of instruments.
In this particular paper, an attempt is made to provide linkages 
between some of these alternative areas of research. By analyzing the 
manner in which governments or marketing agencies might utilize par­
ticular combinations of policy instruments to attain differing objec­
tives, it is possible to derive more detailed specifications of the 
excess supply and demand relationships.
92.0 THE GENERAL MODEL
The simple theoretical model developed in this section is used to 
determine the implications of alternative domestic policies for both 
internal and external market equilibria. The model is not intended to 
represent any particular country, but is developed around a set of 
assumptions which could reflect general conditions in world grain 
markets. The model is sufficiently general that comparisons can be 
made between large and small countries, short" and long-run equilib­
ria, and importing and exporting countries. Stochastic elements have 
been incorporated in the model to reflect the variability associated 
with domestic production and world prices which a country may face.
After the basic model is described, discussion focuses on the 
most commonly used types of policy instruments. These can be loosely 
classified as follows:
(i) pricing instruments;
(ii) storage policies;
(iii) export/import controls;
(iv) production/consumption subsidies;
(v) supply management;
(vl) discontinuous pricing policies.
The primary aim in describing each of these policies is to 
demonstrate their implications for the excess supply and demand rela­
tionships of an individual country. The interaction of these rela­
tionships with an excess supply or demand function for the "rest of 
the world" allows an international equilibrium to be derived. At 
various stages in the analysis, comparisons between alternative policy 
instruments are made to demonstrate their international implications.
2.1 Specification of the General Model
The general model used to represent an individual country can be 
specified in mathematical form as follows
(1) q = a - bP ,c c
(2) Op = c + dPP,t-l + £ *
(3) T - Q -c Qp »
wherel Q is the quantity consumed in the current period;
For ease of presentation, current time-subscripts are not utilized, 
but lagged variables are identified using subscripts.
1
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P is the consumer price in the current period;c
Qp is the quantity produced in the domestic market in the 
current period;
Pp is the producer price in the current period. The 
subscript t-1 denotes the previous period's price;
T is the quantity traded;
a,b,c,d are coefficients in the linear demand and supply 
functions; and
£ is the random component associated with production, 
e ~ N (0,o2).
The international component of this model can be specified in the form 
of a price dependent version of the excess supply function as
(4) P - g + hT + 9 ,w
where P is the world price in the current period;w
g,h are the coefficients of the linear function;
.0 is the random component associated with world price,
9 ~ N (O,o02) and E(e,0)=Oo
In the model it is assumed that both the supply and demand func­
tions can be represented by linear functions and that the supply curve 
is a function of lagged producer prices to reflect the typical situa­
tion in grain production. At this stage, both producer and consumer 
prices are assumed to be exogenous and storage is not incorporated in 
the model. These assumptions are subsequently modified through the 
incorporation of domestic policies. Although the model has been 
specified to reflect the case of an importing country, it can be seen 
that where parameters and prices are such that imports would be nega­
tive, this would imply an exporting country, and the world excess 
function (4) would become a negative function of the level of exports.
2.2 Free Trade Equilibrium
As a base for comparison, a free trade equilibrium can be derived 
under the assumption that producer and consumer prices equal the world 
price in any given period. Thus, in equations (1) and (2), = Pp =
p , and the trade demand function can be expressed as follows
11
(5) T = a ~ bP - c - dP - ew w,t-1
Excess demand is a negative function of world prices and by 
equating it with excess supply (4), equilibrium levels of world price 
and trade can be derived*
Substituting (5) into (4),
( 6 )
P = g + h(a-bP -c-dP -c) + 6 ,W W W,t~l
p = w
g + h(a~c”dP ,"£) + 0 w,t~l
1 + bh
and
T « a - b(g+hT+ 0) - c - dP , - ew, t“l
(7)
T «
a - c - bg - dP - e - b9W,t”l
1 + bh
where ~ denotes an equilibrium value.
By taking expected values of these expressions, it can be seen 
that in the short terra
( 8)
and2
(9)
E(P ) w
g + h(a-c-dP 1) w , t i
1 + bh
~ h2 a2 + a2
Var(P )  ---- 1— ---
W (1+bh)2
where E (P ) in the expected level of world price and Var (P ) is w w
the variance of the world price. Similarly 
~ a - c - bg - dP
( 10) E(T) = w, t-1
1 + bh
and
2 Throughout this paper, expressions of this type are frequently 
derived. In appendix A an example of such a derivation is presented.
12
(in- Var (T) -
c2 + b2a2e 0
(1+bh)2
The general model can be used to derive equilibrium conditions in
the long run when P , = P and E(e) = E(0) “ 0. and also for thew,t-l w *
large and small country cases. In the case of a small country, it is 
assumed that h=0, which implies that the excess function for the world 
is perfectly elastic. In Table 1 a summary of these conditions is 
presented. It can be seen that the long-run equilibrium conditions 
incorporate the effect of the domestic supply response, making the 
excess trade relationships more elastic in response to changes in the 
world price. For a small country where it is assumed that h=0, in the 
free trade case world and domestic prices are not influenced by the 
volume of trade of the country. The volume of trade, however, is 
influenced by short-run disturbances in both domestic and interna­
tional markets.
2.3 Price Intervention
Perhaps the most predominant form of intervention in domestic 
grain markets are policies which influence either producer or consumer 
prices. However, the exact nature of this intervention varies widely 
between individual countries, and ranges from the use of simple import 
tariffs to government-administered pricing. Although it is possible 
to develop specific modeIs of policies in a particular country, such 
models can become complex due to the changing mix and levels of policy 
instruments. In the following analysis, a generalized model is used 
to identify some key relationships which exist in pricing policies.
It will be seen that this framework can incorporate the effects of 
many specific types of policies, and provide a basis for estimating 
empirical relationships to explain how domestic prices change over 
time.
Assume initially that domestic prices for producers and consum­
ers , respectively, can be represented by the following relationships
(12) P = a + y P  + { P P P P w p p,t-l
and
(13) F = a I Y F + fi P c c c w c c,t-1
where P P P are as previously defined, and p w c
a, y, 6 are response coefficients.
These relationships include the key variables which are likely to 
influence the determination of domestic prices. Other exogenous fac­
tors , such as macroeconomic variables, are assumed to be collapsed
13
Table 1— Free trade equilibrium in the short and long run for large 
and small countries.
Large country Small country
Short run
w
g + h(a~C“dP . ,"£> + 6 w, t“l
1+bh
+ 6
c - bg - dP° w, t-1 e-b 6
1 + bh
a - c - bg - dP ,-e-b0 w, t-1
E(V
V a r w
g + h(a-c-dP . .)w # t-1
1 + bh
jj2a2 ff2
e e
(1+bh)2
E (T)
Var (T)
c - bg - dP . , ° w,t-l
1 + b h
a2 + b2a2fl„ £ 8
(1+bh)2
Long run
(Pw,t-l ■ Pwt ; E(6> = E ( e >
g + h(a-c) 
l+h(b+d) 
a - c - g(b+d) 
1 + h(b+d)
- 0)
w
“ g
* 2
= a - c - bg - dPw, t-1
“ a2 + b2a2£ 0
= g
= a - c - g (b+d)
14
into the intercept term, and movements in the exchange rate are re­
flected in the world price variable which is measured in domestic 
currency•
The excess demand function can be derived by substituting these 
relationships into the general model
T - Qa ~
(14)
a - bP - c ~ dP . ! ~ e,c P,t-1
a - b (a + y P + 6 P .) , c c w c c,t-1
- c - d (a + y P + 5 P  ) - e .p p w,t-1 c p,t-2
This equation represents a generalized form of the excess demand 
function. By setting the policy parameters in equations (12) and (13) 
at particular levels, specific policies can be represented. For 
example, in the free trade case Pc,P - P^, which implies that
y ,y = 1 and a ,a ,6 ,6 - 0. Equating this function with the excessc p c p c p
supply function allows an international equilibrium to be determined, 
the equilibrium level of world price in the current period can be
expressed as follows:
w + h {a-b (a +6 P . ,) c c c,t-1
(15) - c - d (a +y P .+6 P „ ] - he + 0 p p w,t-1 p p,t-2
(1+hby )c
and the equilibrium level of trade as
(16)
T = a - b (t + S P  . J  - by gC C C»t“J. c
- c - d (a + y P  ^ 6 V f J  - e - by 0p p w ,t—1 p p,t-2 c
(1+hby )c
The variability of world price and trade can also be derived from the 
above expressions
(17) Var(P )w
h2a2 + q2£ 0
(1+hby )2c
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and
(18) Var(T)
o2 4. ^2y2a2 e c 6
( 1+hby ) 2c
The variability of domestic producer and consumer prices are related 
to the variability of world prices
(19) Var(P ) = y2 Var(P ) ,p p w
and
(20) Var(P ) = y2 Var(P ) ,c c w
It should be noted that these measures of variability reflect the 
instability in the current period only* The lagged response to world 
prices which is incorporated in equations (15) and (16) would indicate 
that there is also dynamic instability associated with the medium term 
equilibrium. For example, in the simplified case where 6^ , 6^  = 0 it
can be shown that world price would oscillate around a long-run
dhy
equilibrium. This cycle will be stable when the expression — -- £—
1+hbyc
is less than unity. It is obvious that in a situation where the 
policy parameter y^ = 0, or in the small country case (h=0), there
would be no dynamic instability or cobweb effect in the model. Other 
cases would need to be analyzed more carefully, or evaluated in a 
simulation model, to determine the full dynamic implications of such 
relationships,
For the general model, the long-run equilibrium conditions can be 
derived by assuming that the expected values of the random variables 
are zero and that all prices are stable. Thus, in the long run
a a
g + h [a - b (— — ) - c - d ( P— ) j 
1-6 1-6
(21) P = ---------------- — -----— —  ,w a y
1 + bh (— L-)+ dh (— L_)
1-6 1-6c P
and
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( 22) T
a a y y
a - b (_JL) - c - d (_-JL) - gb (— JL) - gd (— £_)
1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6c p c p
Y Y_
1 4- hb (— L-) + hd (— L_)
1-6 1-6
Expressions 15 through 22 can be used to identify the impact of a 
range of specific pricing policies on trade and price stability. Some 
of these policies are discussed individually in the following 
sections.
2.3.1 A Fixed; Tariff
In the case of a fixed tariff, the domestic pricing relationships 
(12) and (13) reduce to the following:
(23) P = t + P ,P w
and
(24) P * t + P ,c w
where t is the level of the absolute tariff. In this case, a ,ac p
Y , Y =1, 6,6 = 0  and the trade demand function has thep c c p
following form:
t »
(25) T - a - b (t+P ) - c - d (t4-P ,) - e .w w, t-1
In comparison to the free trade case, the intercept of this func­
tion is lower, but the slope with respect to the world price remains 
unchanged. It can be shown that this policy will lead to a lower 
world price and decreased trade. In the case of an exporting country, 
an export subsidy of t would have the same effect, except that exports 
would increase. In both cases, it can be shown that the variance of 
world price and trade would be equal to that under free trade case.
2.3.2. Ad Valorem Tariff
With an ad valorem tariff, the domestic price relationships would 
be of the following form:
(26) P„ - (1+t) P ,p w
and
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(27) P = (1+t) P ,c w
where t is the proportionate tariff, or in the case of an exporting 
country, the rate of export subsidy applied.
The excess demand relationship would be
(28) T - a - b (1+t) P - c - d (1+t) P - e .w w, t-1
In comparison with free trade this policy would cause the excess 
function to be more elastic with no change in the intercept. This 
rotation of the function causes world prices to decrease and imports 
to decrease (or exports to increase for an exporting country) in both 
the short and long run. Such a policy would stabilize world prices in 
the short run, but may destabilize trade flows.
2.3.3. Deficiency Payment
Deficiency payments are a common feature in both exporting and 
importing countries, and are generally used to maintain producer 
prices above world price levels. Payments are normally made to pro­
ducers to cover the difference between market prices and a guaranteed 
price level, while consumer prices are normally determined by market 
conditions. In some situations, the guaranteed price may be a minimum 
price, and producers receive the market price when it rises above the 
guaranteed minimum. This particular case is discussed in a subsequent 
section on discontinuous pricing policies. Where the guaranteed price 
is always above the world market price, the pricing mechanism can be 
defined as follows;
(29) P - P* ,P
and
(30) P = P ,c w
where P* is the guaranteed price. In the general model, this means 
that a = P*, Yc = 1 and all other price policy coefficients are
equal to zero.
The excess demand function in this case is of the following form:
(31) T = a - bP - c - dP* - e .w
While the slope of this function is the same as that under free 
trade in the short run, the intercept is lower since the guaranteed 
price is higher than the world price. In the short run, this would 
not affect the variability of world price and trade, but the lack of 
producer supply response to changing world prices would make the world
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price less variable in the medium term. The latter effect is due to 
absence of the cobweb reaction associated with lagged production 
response. This conclusion differs from that in other studies where it 
is assumed that supply responds in the current period (Zwart and 
Meilke, 1979; Bale and Lutz, 1979), Supply response in the current 
period would normally have a stabilizing effect during this period due 
to the increased elasticity of the excess function. In that case, the 
short-run effect of the deficiency payment policy would destabilize 
world prices in comparison with free trade.
2.3.4. Variable Levy
Some countries and regions such as the European Community utilize 
a variable levy to maintain both consumer and producer prices at 
levels above world prices. By announcing a support price and charging 
an import levy equal to the difference between this price and the 
world price, domestic producer and consumer prices are isolated from 
changes in world prices within a given period. In this case, the 
policy can be stated in the following simple form:
(32) P = P* ,P
and
(33) P = P* ,c
where P* is the target on support prices. The excess demand function
(34) T = a - bP* - c - dP* - e
is seen to be perfectly inelastic with respect to changes in world 
price. To the extent that the support price is higher than the world 
price, increased production and decreased consumption would lead to 
less imports (or greater exports) and hence the world price is lower 
than in the free trade case. Although the excess demand function is 
price inelastic, fluctuations in domestic production influence the 
level of trade, and hence the variability of world price. The vari­
ance of world price
(35) Var(P ) ” h2o2 + a2w e o
is greater than in the free trade case, but it can be shown that the 
variability in trade
(36) Var(T) = a2e
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may be less, depending on the size of the country concerned, or more 
important, how responsive world price is to variations in the trade of 
the country*
2.3.5 Price Smoothing
A further type of pricing policy can best be described as a price 
smoothing policy. In this case, prices may be set in such a manner 
that they reflect changing world market conditions but only in a par­
tial manner. For example, in an administered pricing system where 
prices are set by a government agency, prices might adjust in the 
following manner*
(37) P 1 + (1 -6 ) (P -P _ .) P,t-1 p w p,t-l
where 6 < 1.p —
This partial adjustment mechanism reflects the following set of 
parameters in the generalized intervention model
(38) (1-6 ) P +p w 6 PP P»t-1
This weighted average pricing formula would lead to an excess function 
of the following form:
(39) T - a - b (1-6 ) P - b6 P - c - d (1-6 ) Pn „c c,t-1 c w p p,t-Z
This type of policy introduces more complex dynamic relationships into 
the model. It can be shown that in the short term such policies will 
stabilize domestic prices and destabilize world prices in comparison 
to free trade* In the example shown, where the weights on the prices 
sum to one, it also can be shown that in the long run expected prices 
would be the same as under free trade.
2.3.6 Summary
The particular examples of pricing policies which have been dis­
cussed have been selected to demonstrate the manner in which such 
policies influence the excess demand function for a particular country 
and how this affects world price and trade. In Table 2, a summary of 
the results obtained is presented. Except for the differences created 
by the use of a lagged supply function the results are consistent with 
those in earlier studies such as Bale and Luts (1979) and Zwart and 
MeiIke (1979). It can be seen that the major factor influencing 
short-term world price stability is the manner in which the domestic 
prices respond to changes in the world price in the current period. 
This price transmission effect is measured in the generalized price
20
Table 2— Impact of alternative pricing policies on the stability of 
world prices and trade.
Policy Var (?w ) Var (T)
Free trade (FT)
P = P p w h2o2 + q2e 0 a2 + b2a2£ 6
P = P c w (1+bh)2 (1+bh ) 2
Generalized price intervention
p = a + y P + 6 P P P P w p p,t-l h2 o2 4- o2£ 0 a2 + b2Y2cr2 e 'c 0
P - a + Y P - + $ P  c c c w c c, t-1 (1+bhY )2 c (1+bhY )2 c
(> FT) (?)
Tariff— specific
P - P + t p w = FT = FT
P = P + t c w
Tariff— ad valorem
P = (1+t) P p w h2 a2 + a2£ 0 a2 + b2 (1+t)2 a2£ D
P - (1+t) P c w (l+bh(1+t))2 (l+bh(1+t))2
(< FT) (?)
Deficiency Payment
P « P* P - FT = FT
P = P c w
Variable levy
P = p*
P h2a2 + a2E 0 a2e
P = P* c (> FT) (?)
Price smoothing
P = (1-6 )P + 6 P t 1 P P w p p,t-l h2 ct2 + a2e 0 a2 + b2S2a2£ C 9
P = (1-6 )p + <$ p c c w c c,t-l (1+bh6 )2 c (1+bh6 )2 c
6p ’6c - 1 (> FT) (?)
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intervention model by the coefficient* For any policy where the
the consumer price transmission effect is less than unity, world mar­
ket price will be destabilized and domestic price will be stabilized 
in comparison to free trade*
The lagged price relationships which are included in the model 
may lead to complex dynamic relationships in the medium term. While 
it is possible to specify the form of such relationships and their 
impacts on the excess demand function, their implications for world 
price and trade stability are more complex. The full impact of these 
relationships can only be analyzed numerically.
The policies which have been presented may be oversimplified 
because they have not accounted for the manner in which the use of 
policy instruments, and their levels might vary between periods. For 
example, while support prices such as those used in the variable levy 
or deficiency payment cases may be fixed within a year, the level of 
the instruments may respond to price changes over time. Support 
prices are frequently changed to reflect changing economic conditions 
both within a country and in world markets. In this case, domestic 
prices may respond to lagged or expected current world prices, gener­
ating a response relationship more similar to the general model. The 
development of models which incorporate these, or more complex dynam­
ics, would require more sophisticated specifications than have been 
used in the past.
2.4 Storage and Pricing Policies
Government supported storage is often a major component of domes­
tic agricultural policies• Stockholding objectives can vary widely 
between countries and may have differing impacts on the level and 
stability of world trade. Storage policies in larger exporting 
countries are often perceived to be oriented toward stabilizing world 
trade and prices, while many smaller countries operate policies which 
have a greater influence on domestic markets, especially where storage 
programs are integrated with pricing or trade controls. In this sec­
tion, a simplified model is developed to demonstrate the manner in 
which alternative storage policies affect the stability of trade. In 
the model developed, it is initially assumed that there is no pricing 
policy, but this is subsequently modified to incorporate both pricing 
and storage policies.
2.4.1 Storage
The basic model can be modified to include a storage policy 
through the addition of a function which describes the change in 
stocks in the current period (AS)
(40) AS = 3 e - 3 0 , 3,3 > 0 ,s p s p —  5
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where the coefficient 3g defines how stocks change in response to
random variation in domestic production and 3 describes how stocksP
change in response to random variation in world price.
Under such a policy* it can be seen that unanticipated increases 
in domstic production will lead to increases in stocks held, and 
short-term increases in the world price would lead to a decrease in 
stocks. While such a specification may appear unnecessarily restric­
tive, it provides a simple description of how the majority of public 
storage policies operate. The relationship is specified in a first 
difference form so that in the long run expected stocks are zero, thus 
ensuring that there is no net accumulation of stocks or change in 
prices.
To complete the model, the excess demand relationship is modified 
to incorporate the effect of the storage policy. Thus, equation (3) 
in the general model is respecified as
(41) T - Q - Q + AS .c p
This implies that increases in stocks would have the effect of in­
creasing imports or decreasing exports.
Substituting these relationships into the general model and 
assuming that there is no separate pricing policy in existence, the 
excess demand function would have the following form:
(42) T ™ a - bP - c - d P  - (1-3 )e - 3 9 .w w,t-1 s p
It can be shown that this storage policy would not Influence the 
expected level of world price or trade, but would influence the varia­
bility in the short term. The expressions for the variability of 
world price and trade are as follows:
(43)
and
(44)
Var(P ) -w
h2 ( ] .—3 ) 2<j 2 + (h 3 — 1) 2p2 s e p 0
(i+bh)2
Var(T) «
(1 —3 ) 2(j2 -j- f (3 ) 2<j2s e p 0
(l+bh)2
The variability of stocks can also be derived as
(45) Var(AS) - 32a2 + 32a2 .S £ P 0
This can be used to provide an indicator of the potential costs 
associated with operating the storage policy. As the variability of
23
stocks increases, it would be expected that the cost of providing 
storage facilities is likely to increase.
It is apparent that the impact of public storage is dependent on 
the value of the policy parameters® Several cases can be identified.
(i) In the situation where 3 = 1  and 3 = 1/h, it can be seens p
that the world price would be completely stabilized, but at the same 
time the variability of the country’s trade would be greater than free 
trade since the country would be absorbing all of the variability in 
world prices® Obviously, for a small country where h tends to be 
zero, this could lead to unreasonable increases in the variability of 
trade and stocks.
(ii) If the policy were only used to compensate for variations 
in domestic production (3g ” 1 and 3^=0), then it can be seen that
world prices and equilibrium trade flows would be partially stabilized 
because the excess function would not he subject to random varia­
tions, Such a policy could not be used to stabilize completely domes­
tic prices, but might be used in some cases to minimize the variabili­
ty in trade for a given country,
(iii) In general, it can be seen that for any policy where 
0 < 3 < 1  and 0 < 3 < 2/h, then the variability of world priceS p ■*“
would be less than under free trade, but the variability of world 
trade may be greater.
The examples given above serve to demonstrate how storage poli­
cies can have differing impacts on world trade stability, depending on 
whether the stocks respond to domestic production variability or world 
prices. For a small country (h=0), response to world price variabili­
ty would not appear to be practical, but a policy aimed at eliminating 
the effects of random variations in domestic production would have an 
impact on the variability of trade.
2,4,2 Pricing Policies
In smaller importing countries it is not uncommon for storage 
policies to be associated with domestic pricing policies in order to 
maintain some degree of self-sufficiency. Although self-sufficiency 
objectives are often not clearly defined, these normally relate to the 
stability of consumer prices and possibly the maintenance of a minimum 
proportion of total domestic supply from domestic production. Poli­
cies of this type are frequently administered through a government 
agency which has responsibility for setting prices and handling domes­
tic stocks. To provide an example of such a policy, the storage model 
previously developed can be modified through incorporation of a simple 
version of the generalized price intervention relationship. Assume, 
for example, that domestic prices are determined by the following 
relationships:
24
(46)
and
(47)
P
P
a + y P P P w
P = a -f y P c c c w
Lagged domestic price response has been omitted from these equations 
to simplify the analysis, and because current price response has the 
greatest influence on short-term stability*
In this model, the trade demand relationship can be specified as 
follows:
(48) T ~ a - b(ct +y P ) - c - d ( a + y P  ,) - ( H  )e ~ M  .c c w p p w,t-1 s p
The variability of world price and trade are as follows:
(49) Var(P )w
(1^ 3 >2a2 + (h e -i)2ff2S £ p 0
( l+bhy ) 2c
and
(50) Var(T)
(1-3 )2a2 + (3 +by )2o2s e p c e
( l+bhy ) 2c
In comparison with the simple storage policy a consumer price 
transmission coefficient (y ) of less than unity would further
destabilize world price, but not necessarily trade volumes» At the 
same time, however, domestic prices and consumption would become more 
stable:
(51) Var(P ) - y2 Var (P„) ,c c w
(52) Var(P )P = y2 VarP (P ) , and w
(53) Var(Q )c = (by )2c Var (P ) .w
In the extreme case where domestic prices are fixed (i .e., 
y^,y^ ” 0), then obviously consumer prices and consumption are
perfectly stable, and a complementary storage policy which responded 
only to the variability in domestic production would ensure that trade
was also stabilized (i.e., 3 = 1 and 3 = 0). Further, if the fixeds p
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domestic prices were set at an appropriate level, it can be seen that 
the particular country could become completely isolated from world 
trade with zero imports and internal stability that is maintained by 
the storage policy. In either case, stable and inelastic excess 
demand would mean that
(54) Var(P ) « ,w o
which may be greater than or less than under free trade depending on 
the relative size of the country concerned, the variability of its 
production, and its elasticity of demand.
2.5 Trade Control Policies
An increasing proportion of countries involved in world trade use 
state trading organizations to manage imports or exports. Typically, 
such organizations control export sales or internal distribution of 
imports, either through licensing or quota arrangements, or by a 
direct involvement in trading. In a static analysis, control of trade 
through quotas can be shown to have a similar effect to the internal 
pricing policies previously discussed, but in a stochastic model they 
can have markedly different impacts on Internal and external stabili­
ty. In analyzing such policies, the particular mechanism which is 
used to control trade is not as important as the manner in which the 
level of trade is allowed to adjust to changing domestic or interna­
tional conditions. For example, consider a trade intervention rela­
tionship of the following form:
(55) t ~ T* - <j>ge - cf>p0 , > 0 f
where T is the quantity traded, T* is a desired or expected level of
trade, and 6 and <b are coefficients which define how trade levels s p
may adjust to changing domestic supply or world price, respectively.
The desired level of trade (T*), which would be negative for 
exports and positive for imports, is assumed to be a function of 
factors which are external to the general model, but could be altered 
to influence the expected level of internal prices. The relationship 
specified assumes that a random increase in domestic production would 
lead to reduced imports (or increased exports) which would stabilize 
domestic grain availability, and that a random increase in world price 
could lead to reduced imports (increased exports) which would influ- 
ence foreign exchange transactions. In the overall mode 1, equation 
(55) would become the trade demand function which would intersect the 
world excess supply function to determine world price:
P = g + hT* — h(f> e + (l-h(j> ) 6 . W s P(56)
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Hence, the variability of world price in the current period can be 
expressed as
(57) Var(P ) = (h<j> )2a2 + (1-hd> )2a2 w s e p 6
With the level of trade controlled, internal prices are deter* 
mined independently of the world price
(58) Q « Q + T c p
and given that is predetermined in the current period,
(59)
P = c
P =c
a - Q.
a - c - d P  f c 1 + £  + T * - < j > e - d > 0  p ,t-1 s p
The variability of P can also be derived asc
(60) Var(P ) c
(1-<J> )202 + (j)202S £ p u
b2
Equations 56-60 define an equilibrium model of the trade control 
policy, but its implications can be seen to change dramatically with 
alternative values of the policy parameters. Several cases are of 
particular interest.
(i) Where the volume of trade is held at a constant level
(i,e., T - T*, and <J> , <j> ~ 0), it can be shown that neither the worlds p
price nor domestic prices are completely stabilized. Unfortunately, 
it is not possible to determine whether these prices are more unstable 
than in the free trade case. In the free trade model developed in 
this study, an individual country has three major impacts on world 
price stability. The most obvious effect is its domestic production 
variability which generally destabilizes world price. The second 
effect is the price stabilizing influence of the domestic demand 
curve, and the third, but most complex, effect is the manner in which 
the size of the country influences the slope of the excess function 
which it faces. Careful measurement would be necessary to determine 
whether the insulation of a country through fixed trade would stabil­
ize or destabilize either world or domestic prices,
(ii) The policy parameters can be set in such a manner that
domestic prices are stabilized (i.e., <j> = 0, <j> - 1) and it can beP s
seen that in this case the world price would be less stable than with
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free trade. This policy would create the possibility of achieving 
self-sufficiency for the country, but it should be noted that it would 
still require variable trade
(61) Var(T) - a2 .e
This effect is equivalent to that of pursuing a fixed domestic price 
policy.
(iii) An alternative strategy would be to allow trade flows to 
respond only to changes in world prices. It can be seen that where
<j> — 0 and <J> - 1/h, then world price would be completly stabilized,s p
but domestic prices would possibly be highly unstable
(62) Var(P ) = _ ---- ,
b2
especially for a smaller country (where h tends to be zero)* A more 
specific version of this type of policy is considered in a later sec­
tion, where the influence of such policies on foreign exchange is also 
considered*
The alternative policies or strategies considered above are seen 
to be varied in their impacts, but an even wider range of possibili­
ties results when trade control is combined with storage.
2*6 Trade Control with Storage
Many state trading organizations simultaneously utilize storage 
policies and trade controls, which generates even greater influence 
on market conditions, especially domestically. This case would 
normally occur where an agency is involved directly in the purchase or 
sale of the product. Common examples include the marketing boards of 
the major wheat exporting countries such as Canada and Australia, but 
such strategies may also be used by smaller developing countries where 
control over the quantities imported and stored is utilized as an 
alternative to price controls.
To analyze such policies, the model developed in the previous 
section can be modified by the addition of the generalized storage 
equation described earlier (40)
(63) AS ® <j) e - (j) 6 ,s p
and through modification of the consumption relationship
Q « Q + T - AS * c p(64)
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The excess demand relationship and the mechanism of world price 
determination remains unchanged, but domestic price determination is 
modified by the storage policy
(65)
a - c - dP i + e  + T * - c ( ) e - " d ) 0 ” B e + e e  p,t-l s p s p
The storage policy does not influence the expected levels of prices, 
which are primarily determined by the level of trade (T*), but it does 
have an effect on the stability of domestic price.
Because of the large number of possible combinations of storage 
and trade control parameters, no attempt is made to discuss each com­
bination in detail, however, a summary is presented in Table 3. Each 
of the 16 cases presented show alternative settings of the four key 
policy response parameters. The cell in the upper left corner is the 
case where all four parameters equal zero, which is the constant trade 
and no storage situation, and the bottom right cell is where all 
parameters are at nonzero levels• It can be seen that each of the 
sixteen cases generate different levels of stability for world and 
domestic prices. Furthermore, the trade policy parameters are the 
only ones which influence the stability of world price, and only in 
the cases where (J>g - 0 and -<|> = 1/h would the world price be perfectly
stable (row 3). To attain domestic price stability at the same time 
would require that a storage policy be used where 3^  = 1/h and $g = 1.
In this case variations in the country’s stocks would absorb the 
instability of the entire market. Such a strategy is similar to the 
storage policy without trade controls discussed In section 2.4. The 
potential use of policies to promote domestic price stability is per­
haps more realistic, and occurs when either trade or storage is used 
to absorb fluctuations In domestic production.
Perhaps the most important conclusion to be derived from these 
results is that the outcomes of combined trade and storage are varied, 
and are crucially dependent on both the instruments used and their 
levels. This suggests that considerable care Is required in the 
empirical analysis of any particular country’s policies when such 
measures are in operation.
2,7 Policies Which Influence Demand
and Supply Relationships
To complete the analysis of domestic agricultural policies influ­
encing the level and stability of world prices and trade, it is neces­
sary to consider the wide range of measures whose primary influence is 
on the position or slope of the domestic demand and supply functions. 
Incorporated in this general category are a wide range of often com­
plex and interacting policies which modify the response of both pro­
ducers and consumers to changes in product prices. Many of these 
measures, such as farm input or consumption subsidies, Influence more
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than one product. This can make it difficult to isolate the impact of 
a particular policy on an Individual product. Such policies are 
typically dealt with in the context of international trade by assuming 
that their effects are incorporated in domestic response functions.
The implications of the removal or a change in a specific policy can 
be evaluated by determining its influence on the position of these 
functions, In this context, financial measures, such as producer and 
consumer subsidy equivalents, have proven useful in providing esti­
mates of how a particular policy might shift the intercept of demand 
and supply functions.
Not all of the policies in this group are amenable to such an 
approach because they may also influence the slope of the function 
concerned. An example of such a policy might be production controls 
which would cause the supply of a product to become perfectly inelas­
tic in the short term. A more subtle example would be a policy under 
which input subsidies are linked to changes in world prices. In some 
countries, it is not unusual for input or credit subsidies to be 
increased when farm incomes fall, often because of low world prices..
In such a case, the effective supply function would become more 
inelastic, which would influence the medium-term instability of world 
prices. As would be expected, policies which shift the functions have 
an impact on the expected level of world prices, while policies which 
alter the slope of the relationships have their primary effect upon 
the stability of world prices.
In general, the presence of these policies would not normally 
present any major problems in the development of international models 
because they can be incorporated in the estimation of the response 
relationships. It is important, however, to recognize the importance 
of these policies. In some situations it may be valuable to Incorpor­
ate intermediate relationships which exist between the policies and 
other macroeconomic or market variables, especially where the policies 
are frequently changed.
2.8 Discontinuous Pricing Policies
In the previous analysis of pricing policies, it was assumed that 
domestic prices are determined by a linear relationship with world 
prices, and in the specific case where domestic prices are fixed, it 
is assumed that this price is always effective. In some cases, how­
ever, intervention prices are used to provide a minimum below which 
domestic prices are supported. This is probably most common with 
deficiency payment policies, where government payments are provided to 
make up the difference between market price and the support price. 
Discontinuities are introduced into the excess demand functions for 
the country concerned, and will influence the stability and expected 
value of world price. Unfortunately, discontinuous functions are not 
amenable to the simple analysis of the type employed in this study, 
and can prove difficult to deal with empirically.
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As a simple example, consider a pricing policy of the following
form:
P ,P = P for P > P* , c p w w —
(66) and
P ,P - P* for P < P* , c p w
where P* is the support price*
When the world price is above the support price, the excess 
demand function of the particular country would be the same as the 
free trade case, i.e.,
(67) T - a - bP - c ~ dP - e ,w w , l—i
and the equilibrium world price and trade would be defined by equa­
tions (6) and (7). When conditions are such that the world price 
falls below the support price, then the fixed domestic price would 
cause the trade demand function to become perfectly inelastic below 
this price
(68) T - a - bP* - c - dP - e .W, L i.
In the simple model presented here, it is possible to determine 
the probability of the world price falling below the support price, 
given information about the random elements in the model. This makes 
it possible to determine the implications of such policies on the dis­
tribution of world and domestic prices in the short run. In Figure 1, 
it can be seen that even where the expected value of the free trade 
price is above the support price, the distribution of prices is influ— 
enced by the presence of such policies. Panel A depicts a hypotheti­
cal normal distribution of world prices, and It can be seen that with 
a support price of P* the domestic price distribution is truncated, 
which reduces domestic price variability and increases the expected 
value (panel B). At the same time, the variability of the world price 
would be increased by the skewed distribution, and the expected value 
of the price would fall (panel C). This simple example has demon­
strated the complex effects of such policies, which would become even 
more complicated in the longer run when supply response and other 
dynamic effects are incorporated.
Discontinuous storage policies can create similar distortions and 
difficulties in analysis. It is not uncommon for governments or mar­
keting agencies to operate storage policies which accumulate stocks to 
maintain minimum prices. In such a case, the excess demand function 
would become more elastic as world prices approach the support price, 
and variability in prices would be moderated by variability in 
stocks• The distribution of prices and stocks are further influenced 
by the manner In which stocks are released.
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Figure 1. Probability distributions of prices with minimum price 
policy„
A. Free trade distribution of P and Pw c
Probability
Price level
B e With minimum price policy --- domestic price
Probability
C. With minimum price —  world price
Probability
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While the discontinuous relationships described above can be 
readily simulated with knowledge of the appropriate domestic response 
functions and support prices, they may prove difficult to estimate 
econometrically from observed behavior in a particular market, espe­
cially where support prices vary between periods. The most feasible 
approach to estimating these relationships would appear to be use of 
nonlinear relationships which provide an approximation to the kinked 
trade demand relationships# The world wheat model estimated in the 
study by Schwartz (1983) provides some estimates of such relationships 
for discontinuous storage policies, but the model developed does not 
allow for variations in real support prices over time. The formula­
tion of such models are further discussed in later sections of this 
paper.
2.9 Summary
This section has outlined the broad range of policies which are 
likely to influence a country's trade in a particular product. Poli­
cies have been loosely classified into those which influence: product
prices, the quantity stored between periods, the quantities traded, 
and the underlying demand and supply relationships. These policies 
have been analyzed in a generalized model and it has been clearly dem­
onstrated that many of these policies have quite different implica­
tions for the level and stability of price and trade. While this 
classification has proved useful in understanding the mechanics of 
particular policies, it contributes little to the understanding of why 
countries select particular policies, or why some policies are more 
common than others. To consider these issues, it is necessary to 
focus attention on objectives which can underlie policy choice.
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3.0 AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED POLICY OBJECTIVES
An exhaustive analysis of the implications of the policies which 
have been identified earlier is beyond the scope of the present study, 
but it is useful to demonstrate how alternative policies might be used 
to attain some commonly held domestic objectives. This can prove use­
ful in understanding the prevalence of particular combinations of 
instruments, and the manner in which policy response parameters might 
be determined. Self-sufficiency in grain production is probably the 
most general and often quoted objective of grain importing countries. 
There is a range of alternative policies which might be utilized in 
attaining such an objective, and these alternatives can have different 
implications for trade stability, storage levels, government costs, 
and perhaps more important, world price stability. In the following 
section, the general model is used to derive analytical measures of 
some of these effects. Subsequently, the model is utilized to demon­
strate the effect of different policies on foreign exchange earnings. 
It is frequently assumed that the primary focus of policies in export­
ing countries is the maximization of foreign exchange earnings. The 
analysis presented highlights the differences between alternative 
export strategies which countries might follow.
The specific examples selected for analysis are intended to dem­
onstrate the implications of combinations of policies which can be 
found in individual countries, and to identify some key response rela­
tionships which would need to be considered in analyzing empirically 
an individual country’s policies.
3.1 Self-Sufficiency
Self-sufficiency is often a loosely defined objective, but it 
generally Implies an attempt to attain domestic consumption stability 
as well as to reduce the dependence on imports. In this analysis a 
more specific definition of self-sufficiency will be used in which it 
is assumed that domestic prices are completely stabilized. In each 
policy considered it can be seen that trade dependence could be 
minimized by selecting appropriate instrument levels. In the general 
model which has been specified in this study, the assumption of con­
sumer price stability would also ensure consumption stability as 
demand relationships are nonstochastic. In total six alternatives to 
ensure consumer price stability can be selected from the range of 
alternative policies previously discussed. The characteristics of 
each of these are briefly described below.
3.1.1 Pricing Policy
Of the pricing policies previously considered, only the variable 
levy would ensure domestic price stability. Fixed price levels (P*) 
would be selected to ensure an appropriate level of expected trade, 
and trade volumes would vary to reflect the short-term variability in 
domestic production. In Table 4 the expressions which define the
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Table 4— Stability Impacts of Alternative Self-Sufficiency Policies
Variance of World 
Price 
Var (P )
Variance of 
Trade Levels 
Var (T)
Variability of 
Sto^ Jc 
Var (AS)
1. Price Policy
P = P = p* c p
T - a - c - (b+d)P* -
h2a2 + a2e 0
(> FT)
2, Storage Policy
A S = 0 e - 0 f s p
(6„ = 1 = - )
T = a - bP - c - dP - Z- Qw w,t-l ,b
0
(< FT)
(i)2o2 
h 6
o2 + (I)2 *a| 
h
3, Import Policy
T - T* - cb e
(*s = 11
4. Fixed Import & Storage
AS = 3 e s
(6 = 1)s
X = x*
h2a2 + a2t 0
(> FT)
(? FT)
a 2 £
5. Import & Storage
AS - 6 £s
T = T*
(6 + 4 = 1)o b
(h4> )2a2 + a2s e 9
(? FT)
>2cr2 8 £ 0 a2 s £
6, Strategic Stock
AS = 6 e - 6 0s p
T * T* - <(> e - M  s P
(0 s -  1)
< <f> = 6 ) 
P P
2^ *2 CT2 + )2a2b e  p 0
(? FT)
d)2a2 + <j)2a2 s e p o 0 a2 + 0 a2 6 E p a
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trade demand relationship and its impact on world price, trade and 
stock stability are presented* By comparing these expressions with 
those of the free trade equilibrium, (9) and (11), it can be seen that 
world price is destabilized through the use of the variable levy but 
trade levels may be either stabilized or destabilized. This type of 
strategy is similar to that which has been pursued by the European 
Community for a wide range of products.
3.1.2 Storage Policy
If a country were to rely solely on storage to ensure domestic 
price stability, it would be necessary to use stocks in such a way as 
to stabilize world prices. Stocks would have to respond both to 
variability in world prices created by production fluctuations in 
other countries and in the country’s domestic production. Although 
not considered here, a tariff would have to be used if the objective 
were also to change the expected level of trade. A specific tariff 
would not influence the stability implications presented in Table 4. 
From Table 4 it can be seen that this strategy would have a beneficial 
impact on world price stability, but would lead to highly variable 
levels of imports and stocks for small countries. For a large coun­
try, however, (where h > 1) the volume of trade may be less variable 
than under the price policy alternative. Although the United States 
is not an importing country concerned with self-sufficiency, the 
impact of its domestic price support program for grains is similar to 
this type of strategy.
3.1.3 An Import Control Policy
Controls on imports could be used to stabilize domestic prices 
and change the level of trade dependence. In this case, a country 
might have a fixed target or expected level of trade, but trade is 
varied to adjust completely for current period fluctuations in domes­
tic production. In analytical terms, this policy has the same impact 
as the fixed pricing policy described above, but it would obviously 
involve quite a different administrative structure. Again, it would 
lead to destabilized world prices, but not necessarily trade flows. 
One advantage of both this and the pricing policy is that they do not 
require public stockholding. This may be an important consideration 
for many countries. The remaining three strategies which are con­
sidered, however, involve both trade controls and storage policies, 
but with different emphasis in each case.
3.1.4 Fixed Imports and Storage
Where a country uses storage merely to offset variations in 
domestic production, the level of imports could remain fixed from year 
to year. Of the policies considered in this analysis, this is the 
only alternative which would lead to completely stable trade. This 
would be the situation for a country which attempts to maintain a high
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level of self-sufficiency by reducing trade, in which case domestic 
storage would be needed to stabilize domestic consumption or prices. 
From Table 4 it can be seen that this would lead to a world price 
which is more stable than in either the pure price or import control 
policies. However, world prices may be less stable than under free 
trade, although this is not inevitable. As discussed in section 2.5, 
the effect would depend on the country’s potential net contribution to 
world price stability in the absence of its policy. What is clear is 
the variability in stocks would be less than under the "pure" storage 
case which attempted to stabilize the entire market.
3.1.5 Import and Storage
A more commonly occurring approach involves a mixed strategy of 
variable imports and the use of storage. This is an intermediate case 
to the previous two policies which have been considered. Shortfalls 
in domestic supplies would be made up either from reducing domestic 
stocks or increasing imports, and surpluses would result in increased 
stocks or reduced imports. The strategy would be most applicable 
where trade and stocks are controlled by a single authority such as a 
marketing board, or a government importing agency, and would represent 
the stltuation in many centrally planned countries. The analytical 
results in Table 4 show that the world price would be more stable than 
under any of the previous policies considered, except for the fixed 
imports and storage policy (section 3.1.4). Trade volumes would be 
more stable than under pricing or import control policies, and the 
variability of stocks would be less than in any of the other policies 
which included storage. Again, it is not possible to demonstrate 
whether world prices would be more or less stable than under free 
trade, except for the special case of a small country where there 
would be no difference.
3.1.6 A Strategic Stock Policy
The previous two strategies which have incorporated domestic 
storage policies have presumed that stocks and trade in the country do 
not respond to world price variability. At the other extreme, the 
pure storage policy assumed that all of the variability in world price 
was absorbed domestically, but it is possible to define an intermedi­
ate strategy. Consider the case where both trade and storage respond 
to changes in world price in such a manner that in low-priced periods 
imports are increased and stocks are accumulated, and in high-priced 
periods imports are reduced and stocks are drawn down.
In the long run, the expected level of the change in stocks would 
still be zero but because the variability of stocks is greater than in 
the previous two policies, the expected level of stocks held would 
need to be greater to avoid premature stock exhaustion. It is for 
this reason that we have termed this a strategic stock policy.
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The impact of strategic stocking on world price variability is 
complex* It is possible for market prices to be more stable than in 
the previous strategy (where h ^ <  1), thus it is also possible for
world price to be more stable than under free trade* The variability 
of both imports and stocks are increased by the same amount,: which is 
to be expected because of the close linkage between imports and stor­
age. The opportunistic purchasing from the world market which is 
implied by this strategy has implications for foreign exchange flows, 
and these are discussed to some extent in the following section,
Where a country is concerned primarily with food security, it may 
be possible to observe a closely related strategy in which a country 
increases imports in response to increases in world prices in the 
short term. Because the general model does not incorporate the possi­
bility of production shortfalls or stock-rundowns, such a policy may 
not seem to be necessary, but this type of behavior has been observed 
on specific occasions (Schwartz). The implications of this type of 
strategy can be determined by modifying the signs in the policy 
response functions to incorporate a positive relationship between 
fluctuations in world prices and imports and changes in stocks. This 
will not change the variability of trade or stocks but the variability 
of world price
(69) Var(P ) = h2<j)2o2 + (l+h<f> )2a2W S t  p a
will be greater than with the negative price response. Perhaps It is 
not surprising that such a strategy could exacerbate variability in 
world price, but it is still possible for prices to be less variable 
than with free trade.
3,1,7 Summary
The simple analysis presented above has demonstrated that there 
are a wide range of alternative strategies that an individual country 
could pursue in an attempt to achieve domestic market stability and 
increased self-sufficiency. With the exception of the pure-pricing 
and trade control policy, all of the policies have different impacts 
on the stability of world price, trade and domestic stocks. There are 
also dissimilarities in their effects on foreign exchange, and govern­
ment costs, which have not been described. Perhaps the most interest­
ing conclusion which can be drawn from this analysis is that in many 
of the strategies considered, it cannot be demonstrated that world 
prices would necessarily be destabilized by the use of a policy which 
stabilizes domestic markets. This contrasts markedly with some pre­
vious analysts * comments about the relationship between domestic poli­
cies and world price stability.^ This conclusion results from con­
sidering the more complex interactions which can occur between storage
3 Note the quotation from Johnson (1975) in section 1.2
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and trade control policies* They highlight the need to consider, in 
more detail, the specific elements which make up a domestic policy, 
and the manner in which such policies respond to changing market 
conditions*
3.2 Alternative Exporting Strategies
Several of the major exporting countries in world grain markets 
have export marketing agencies with the responsibility of maximizing 
returns to producers* The general model can be used to analyze alter­
native strategies which such an agency might pursue using a coordi­
nated storage and trade control policy, and presuming that they are 
concerned with the foreign exchange implications of their trading.
This is similar to the environment faced by both the Canadian and 
Australian wheat boards. It is obvious that if such agencies face 
excess demand curves for their products, then foreign exchange could 
be maximized in the short term by equating marginal revenues with 
marginal costs, but with uncontrolled production, this could lead to 
either an accumulation of stocks or an inability to supply. To avoid 
this possibility, it is important to consider only strategies which 
maintain a long-run balance of supply and demand and an expected 
change in stocks which is zero.
For ease of analysis, the general model, in which a positive 
level of trade (T) represented imports, can be inverted to represent 
the situation facing an exporting country. This involves no loss of 
generality, but simplifies the understanding of the results presented.
The demand and supply relationships specified in equations (1) 
and (2) would remain unchanged, but an export function is specified to 
represent the exporting decisions of the agency,
where X is the level of exports in the current period, X* is the ex­
pected level of exports, and all other variables are as previously 
defined. This specification implies that increases in either domestic 
production or world prices would lead to increased exports.
Although it is not a necessary part of the model, it can be seen 
that domestic stability could be attained by developing a storage 
policy which maintain a balance between domestic supply and demand and 
exports. In this case,
(70) X = X * + < b e + < j > e ,s p
(71) AS " Q - Q - X , p c
and by substituting in (1) (2) and (70)
(72) AS = c t dP , + e -  a + b P  - X * ~ d > e - d > 0 .W,t“1 c s p
Then if
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(73) X* = c + dP - a ™ bP ,w, t"l c
which is the expected level of exports in the current period, the 
storage policy would be of the following form:
(74) AS - (l~cf> ) e - <j> 0 ,s p
and it can be seen that the expected change in stocks would be zero.
A joint export and storage policy of this form would ensure that 
stocks do not accumulate persistently, and that export levels would 
still respond to changes in supply and demand within the country. It 
also allows for independent price intervention within the country.
A world market equilibrium can be determined by equating the ex­
port function (70), with the excess demand from the rest of the world,
(75) P » g + hX + 6 .w
The equilibrium level and variability of the world price are as 
follows:
(76) P = g - hX* - h<|> e - h<|> 8 + 9 »w s p
(77) Var(P ) = h2<j>2a2 + (l-h^ )2a2 .W S £ p u
The level of exports is determined by equation (70) and their 
variability is
(78) Var(X) <J>2a2 + s e *p°9
In this model the policy response parameters (<J> ,0 ), can bes p
used to represent alternative export strategies which an export agency
might follow. For example, if both parameters were set to zero trade
would be predetermined, and if <j> - 0 and <J> - 1/ti world price woulds p
be stabilized. Such policies are equivalent to those already discus­
sed for importers, but the impact of such policies upon foreign ex­
change earnings has not been identified.
By defining current period foreign exchange earnings (FE) as
(79) FE “ P . X ,w
and by substituting in equations (70) and (76), and taking expected 
values, it is possible to derive an expression for the expected level 
of foreign exchange earnings,
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(80) E(FE) = X*g - hX*2 - h(f)2cj2 - + A> a2 .S E p 0 P 9
This expression is a quadratic function of the policy response
parameters and permits an evaluation of the impact of alternative
exporting strategies on expected earnings. As well as the policies
already defined, optimal levels of the parameters can be derived by
maximising the function. It can be shown that expected foreign
exchange earnings are maximized when 6 ~ 0 and “ l/2h.s p
In Table 5 a summary of the implications of the three alterna­
tives are presented. This is not an exhaustive list of available 
options but highlights the range of possibilities. The associated 
storage policies which are required to stabilize domestic markets are 
also defined, and are seen to absorb all of the domestic variability 
as well as a varying amount of instability created by the trade 
policy.
It can be seen from Table 5 that the three policies have markedly 
different impacts on the variability of exports, stocks and world 
prices, but both the fixed export policy and the world price stabiliz­
ing policy generate the same level of expected foreign exchange earn­
ings, The increased earnings associated with the optimal policy are 
seen to depend on the variability in world prices, and the slope of 
the excess demand curve facing the country concerned.
The results suggest that a smaller country which faces a more 
elastic excess demand curve (h tends to be zero) would have a higher 
level of expected earnings, but there would be a trade-off between 
these earnings and the variability of trade flows and stocks re­
quired, In the extreme situation, any small country could become a 
speculator on a world market if they had the finances and storage 
capacity to do so.
In the optimal policy, exports would change by only one-half of 
the amount which would be required to completely stabilize world 
price, but the results show that the world price would be only one- 
quarter as variable as in the case where exports did not change (the 
fixed trade case). These results suggest that it may be in the inter­
ests of an exporting country to partially stabilize world prices. 
However, it is unlikely to be in its interests to completely stabilize 
world prices, but rather to exploit the changes in marginal revenues 
which are caused by fluctuations in the excess demand curve which it 
faces. Such a policy should not be confused with the monopolistic 
exploitation of the excess demand, which would involve a change in the 
expected level of exports and would require the use of production con­
trols or export taxes.
As might he expected, there is an equivalent strategy that would 
allow an importing country to minimize the foreign cost of a given 
level of expected imports. This would result from following the 
strategic stock policy where imports are a negative function of the
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disturbances in world prices (0). The optimal response parameters
would be, <f) = 0  and <J> = l/2h, which are equivalent to those in thes P
exporter model. Unfortunately, the simple analytical model developed 
here makes it difficult to derive conclusions about the variability of 
foreign exchange earnings under alternative policies.
In summary, this analysis further highlights the differences 
between policies or strategies which might be followed in a particular 
country. Although individual policies could be analyzed in considera­
bly greater depth with the derivation of other measures, such as pro­
ducers' and consumers' surpluses and government costs, the major 
emphasis has been on understanding the mechanics of policies and the 
manner in which they interact with the world market. It has been 
clearly demonstrated that It is important to understand in greater 
depth how pricing, storage, and trade control elements of a country's 
policies interact, and how they respond to changing market conditions.
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4.0 IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
It has been noted earlier in this paper that a growing awareness 
of the importance of domestic policies has led to a movement away from 
the estimation of simple free trade models of world grain markets, and 
in many of the more recent analyses, policy reactions have been incor­
porated or endogenized within the trade model* There appear to have 
been two major approaches used in direct modelling of such policy 
reactions. The first of these involves the derivation and estimation 
of a generalized reduced form relationship for trade. This is pre­
sumed to capture the major interactions between world price and either 
trade itself, or domestic supply and demand, and normally incorporate 
exogenous variables which influence both supply and demand, as well as 
the policy decisions* Examples of such models include those of Abbott 
(1979), Zwart and Meilke (1979) and Blandford and Schwartz (1983).
The second approach has been to develop models which attempt to 
incorporate more specific elements of the policies* Price interven­
tion and storage response relationships have been estimated in the 
models developed by Chisholm and Tyers (1982) and Lattimore and Zwart 
(1978). Models of this type have provided considerable information 
about the manner in which policies have influenced trade, but perhaps 
the major short-coming of both approaches has been the dependence on a 
generalized specification of the structural model for each country or 
region. With the large number of individual relationships which must 
be estimated in international trade modelling, such an approach is not 
surprising, but it may not be adequate to capture the range of diver­
sity which can exist in policies and their effects*
The analytical results in this study have emphasized the complex 
interactions which can exist between the elements that make up domes­
tic policy. Three general types of intervention have been identified 
as being of the greatest importance: pricing, storage and trade con­
trol. While pricing and storage policies have been incorporated in 
many existing models, it is commonly presumed that they are either the 
only policy elements that are involved, or that they also capture the 
effects of other policies. The model developed here has also included 
trade control policies, covering a wide range of state trading and 
producer board activity as well as quotas, and which have been shown 
to have different impacts on the stability of international trade.
This emphasizes the importance of considering the policies of indiv­
idual countries in more detail than has been evident in previous 
models, and particularly in cases where trade control policies are 
employed.
4.1 Alternative Structural Models
It is apparent that combinations of the three general types of 
policies discussed in this paper could be observed in a country under 
study. In developing a structural model for a particular country it 
is, therefore, important to observe and differentiate the key elements 
of its policy. This requires more than an understanding of the
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specific instruments which are used, and it is usually necessary to 
explore the dynamics of the policy formation process itself• Valuable 
information can be gained by observing how frequently policy instru­
ments are changed, and by whom the decisions are made. For example, 
if domestic support prices are announced in advance of the crop year 
and day-to-day importing decisions are made by a government agency, 
the structural model would be different than in a country where 
importing decisions are made on an annual basis and prices are changed 
within the season to absorb the flow of imports. These examples high­
light the fact that, in general, a maximum of two of the three types 
of policies discussed would be operational in a particular country. 
Although the third policy element might be present in some cases, it 
would be residual to the other two elements because of the need to 
clear markets or determine domestic prices.
To clarify this discussion, seven of the most likely combinations 
of policies are identified in Table 6. For each case the relation­
ships which would be estimated, and the variables which would be 
derived or solved for, are defined. It can be seen that the approach 
required in each case is different. While the categorization is 
obviously not exhaustive, it can prove useful in identifying the key 
characteristics of national policies, and thus provide a framework for 
estimating individual country modeIs. Without attempting to describe 
any of the details of actual policies, it would appear that individual 
countries readily fall into the categories described. For example, 
the Economic Community's policies would fall in category B , the United 
States in F , Canada in G , and the policies of Japan, the USSR and 
other centrally planned economies would be typified by category D.
It might be envisaged that the approach of estimating different 
structural models for individual countries would involve considerably 
more detail in modelling. However, it can be seen that the total num­
ber of relationships that would be estimated would be little different 
than that required to estimate a generalized model which included both 
storage and price relationships for each country* Increased effort 
would be required to understand the economic characteristics of the 
policies. Even where the model is to be estimated in reduced form, 
this understanding would be valuable in selecting an appropriate equa­
tion form, or in imposing constraints on estimation. The theoretical 
results derived in earlier sections of this paper can be useful in 
helping to identify the form of excess demand or supply relationships 
for particular combinations of policies.
4,2 The Specification of Individual Relationships
The model used in the theoretical analysis has assumed a simpli­
fied structure, and has included responses to short-run stochastic 
disturbances which can prove difficult to represent. This section 
briefly describes how important components might be incorporated in 
relationships which can be econometrically estimated. Estimation of 
underlying supply and demand relationships is not discussed as these 
would be similar to those used in many other models. It is important
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to note however* that these relationships would be required to esti­
mate fully any of the structural models described in Table 6. Discus­
sion centers on estimation of the policy relationships which describe 
the operation of pricing, storage, and trade control policies.
4.2.1 Pricing Policies
In section 2.3 it was suggested that a wide range of alternative 
pricing policies could be described by individual linear relationships 
between domestic prices, world prices, and lagged prices (equations 
(12) and (13)). Where information is available about the specific 
form of the price intervention, it has been shown that more specific 
forms of this relationship might be applicable. In the medium to long 
run, however, even these policies might require a more general speci­
fication to account for the manner in which specific instruments such 
as support prices or tariffs respond to changing market conditions.
Relationships of this type have been frequently estimated, but 
attention has normally been focused on measuring short term price 
transmission relationships between world and domestic prices. These 
have often proven to be insignificant where price intervention is 
known to exist, which is not surprising as many of the intervention 
prices are established in advance of crop seasons. To accurately 
reflect the formation of domestic prices in such an environment, it 
may be necessary to identify the lagged relationships between world 
and domestic prices in more detail.
The presence of discontinuous pricing policies of the form des­
cribed in section 2.8 might require the specification of more complex 
nonlinear relationships. At present, this is a relatively unre­
searched topic which could become increasingly important as work in 
this area continues. Exogenous variables would normally be included 
to account for the manner In which macroeconomic or other market 
variables are expected to influence policy makers1 decisions. The 
selection of such variables would depend on individual market condi­
tions and further analysis of the policies concerned.
4.2.2 Storage Policies
Many of the existing models of international grain markets have 
incorporated relationships which explain the levels of stocks, espe­
cially for major grain exporting countries. For other countries one 
of the major difficulties has been collecting suitable data, but 
improved data is continually becoming available, which should make it 
possible to estimate such relationships for a wider range of coun­
tries . A theoretical model has been used in this study to show that 
the response of storage policies to short-term changes in world price 
and domestic production has an influence on the stability of world 
price. It might even be argued that with the prevalence of fixed 
pricing in the wheat markets it is more important to detail the price 
responsiveness of storage policies than domestic demand relationships.
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The theoretical storage relationship developed in this study is 
of a specific form which assumes that storage agents respond to 
stochastic disturbances in markets (equation 40). This might appear 
somewhat restrictive for a realistic market environment, but the rela" 
tionship can be modified to reflect the manner in which agents form 
expectations about the future.
Given the theoretical form of the storage equation (40),
(81) AS - 8 e " 8 9 ,s p
the short-term variability in domestic production (e) can be rep re- 
sented by a variable which measures the difference between current 
production (Q ) and an expected level of production Q*. The
expected level of production could be determined in a number of ways. 
In a simplified trade model, Blandford and Schwartz (1983) utilized
the trend level of Q to form such a variable, and Tyers and ChisholmP
(1982) used a three-year moving average of past production to rep re- 
sent the expected level of production in the current year. The latter 
method of determing Q* would probably be the most flexible and alsop
the most useful in any simulation analysis where trends may change.
A similar variable could be constructed to reflect variability in 
world price. It would be assumed that stocks would fall by some func­
tion of the degree to which current price is above expectations, and 
the converse when prices are below expectations. Thus, an estimated 
storage relationship could be of the following form:
(82) AS - f (<L“Q*, PH?*) p p w w
where Q* and P* are the expected levels of production and prices 
described above.
In the special case where a storage policy is seen to be clearly 
related to stabilizing the domestic market, and there is no domestic 
price control, it may be more relevant to assume that the stocks 
respond to domestic rather than world prices. Also, where stocks are 
held on a commerical basis Tyers and Chisholm have shown how interest 
and storage costs might be incorporated in the price expectation rela­
tionship. If stocks are publically owned, however, it may be more 
important to consider the use of alternative function relationships 
that reflect discontinuities in the storage relationship, or the 
different rates at which stocks are accumulated and released. The 
policies which influence grain storage in the United States might be 
seen as a clear case of the latter situation, and may pose special 
problems in estimation.
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4,2.3 Trade Control Policies
Relationships which attempt to explain the level of trade asso­
ciated with trade control policies have not been widely used in trade 
models. Blandford and Schwartz (1983) have used a generalized rela­
tionship , somewhat similar to the theoretical model developed in this 
study, in an attempt to isolate the short-term trade response in coun­
tries. They assumed that trade levels responded to deviations around 
trend in quantity produced and world price and although their analysis 
was only partially successful, this was probably due to their use of a 
simple, generalized model.
The theoretical model assumed in this analysis has been specified 
as follows:
(8 3 )  T = T * - < f > e - < ( > 8 .s p
In a similar manner to that described in the discussion of storage 
models, the variables £ and 0 could be represented by deviations 
around expected levels of domestic production and world price, respec­
tively. It is recognized that these variables may incorporate devia­
tions other than those caused by the short-run variability in supply 
and price, but this may be more realistic in an actual model. The 
variable T * , which is presumed to reflect the expected level of trade, 
provides the possibility of incorporating lagged or exogenous varia­
bles which are known to influence trade in the estimated equation. 
These variables would be specific to a particular country, and could 
also include constraints such as foreign exchange availability and 
levels of stocks.
In some of the specific strategies described in this study it was 
noted that there could be a high degree of complementarity between 
storage and trade control policies, especially where there is an 
objective of domestic stability. This situation could require the 
simultaneous estimation of both storage and trade relationships for an 
individual country. Particularly for larger countries, simultaneity 
may exist among trade control policies. The large number of exogenous 
variables involved often means that models of this type are over­
identified, but seemingly unrelated techniques can be employed to 
reflect the close association between trade policies of larger coun­
tries and the constraints imposed by global production.
4.3 Summary and Conclusions
In the preceding discussion no attempt has been made to suggest a 
general form of structural model which might be applied to all coun­
tries. Rather, the importance of developing separate models for 
individual countries has been stressed. It is suggested that indiv­
idual models should reflect the combinations of policies used in each 
case. This requires increased attention to understanding the economic 
inter-relationships which exist in the policy formation process, and
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particularly the manner in which policy instruments are changed in
both the short and medium term.
The need for this approach is evident from the wide range of 
alternative specifications of excess demand functions which have been 
derived in the theoretical analysis of alternative policy combina­
tions, The manner in which policies respond to short-term instability 
in markets has been shown to be an important part of these relation­
ships and suggests the need to develop stochastic models which accu­
rate ly reflect the source, as well as the response, to instability•
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APPENDIX A
To derive an expression for Var(P )„ given that
~ g h (a-c-dP d 9P = w a t~1 •
1 + bh
and £ ~ N (0, a2) s£
0 ™ N (0 ,  a2 ) j
E ( e ( 0) -  0 t
the variance of P can be defined as: w
V“ < V  - E (Pw -E(Pw))2
-  E  ( ~h E . + . 9) 2
1 + bh
,h2e2 + 2he6 + 02
-  £ — - -----)
(1+bh)2
h2a2 -f a2_ £ 0
(1-fbh)2
as E(e)2 = a2 , £
E(0)2 = 0| ,
and E(e9) = 0 .
